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Abstract - In this paper we urge the creation of new managerial 
tools and techniques that are relevant to the complexity of 
today’s system of systems (SOS). Normal modes of command 
and control systems cannot be effective under conditions where 
new constraints are added on a recurrent basis to the system of 
systems in response to emergent problems within the systems due 
to increased coupling introduced in component elements of the 
SOS. We present a first-step understanding of why unanticipated 
failures find more potential and more pathways to their 
occurrence when interventions in SOS operations, standards or 
processes are conducted without enough insight and without a 
care for basic laws of complexity. We then demonstrate a 
condition where the incremental changes actually lead to failure 
of the SOS to meet its performance parameters. We hope that 
this work set the foundation for exploring the effects of coupling 
across hierarchical levels of SOS. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Normal accident theory [1] states that system 
complexity and coupling, readily present in all highly 
technological systems, lead to accidents which are normal. 
By using the term “normal” Perrow sought to convey the 
notion that accidents of catastrophic nature should be 
normally expected wherever complexity and coupling are 
present.  Previous work [2] supported normal accident 
theory with fresh evidence from experimentation with 
graphs. In this paper we intend to explore a theory of 
complexity escalation, to show that the grounds for normal 
accidents can be sown by repeated responses to detected 
risks and uncertainties in the design and during operation of 
human-machine systems [3]. 
 
Reference [2] modeled the relationship between close 
coupling and the possibility of system failure in complex 
systems. Closer coupling has been shown to increase the 
possibility and shorten the likely duration of system 
trajectory to a total collapse, and their work demonstrated 
the scale impacts of complexity on coupling and system 
failure. We have chosen to use the word collapse for this 
paper, since it more closely describes a likely result of 
imposing closer coupling. 
 
Since a system of systems (SOS) is rarely designed to 
perform the function or functions that it is tasked to 
provide, it is possible that collapse may not mean complete 
dissolution of the system of systems, but some lower level 
of operation, where the component systems largely 
maintain their coherence yet the SOS does not function as 
desired in its SOS role. For example, consider the system of 
systems that provides electrical power for a nation. This 
SOS contains systems to design, contract, build, outfit, test 
and deliver to service the electrical generation and 
distribution systems of the nation’s electrical grid. It also 
contains systems to recruit, train, retain and advance the 
workers that man and maintain those ships systems from 
early in-service until the components are retired from 
service. The SOS also contains systems that provide 
sensors, networks and communications systems allowing 
the components to act in consort with other components. 
The systems that comprise the SOS often operate 
independently of one another, and connections can be 
difficult to observe. Later in this paper, we will example a 
more closely coupled SOS. 
 
II. COUPLING AND COMPLEXITY  
Perrow [1] defined tight coupling as “processes 
happen very fast and can’t be turned off, the failed parts 
cannot be isolated from other parts and there is no other 
way to keep the production going safely. Then recovery 
from the initial disturbance is not possible; it will spread 
irretrievably for at least some time”. Reason later noted that 
organizations seek to prevent failure, often by measuring 
errors, with the intention of preventing them from 
reoccurring. However, this helps “it raises some further 
questions: how can we best gauge the 'morbidity' of high-
risk systems? Do systems have general indicators, 
comparable to a white cell count or a blood pressure 
reading, from which it is possible to gain some snapshot 
impression of their overall state of health?” [4].  As we will 
show later in the paper, coupling and complexity create 
grounds for fast propagation of uncertainties, which is a fast 
magnification of small errors into large failure and collapse. 
Dekker [5] discusses the non-linear relationships in 
complex systems where small events can produce large 
results. Dekker also discusses the ignorance of components 
about the behavior of the system as a whole, and that the 
components do not know the full effects of their local 
actions. 
   
 
A. A Simple Mathematical Formulation 
A simple mathematical notation of coupling is 
square matrix of size n×n, A=[ai,j] where n is the number of 
system elements/components, and each off-diagonal 
element of matrix ai,j corresponds to the amount of coupling 
between components i and j. The elements i and j can also 
be task processes with specific inputs and outputs. In task 
oriented and procedural system (like organizational 
systems) ai,j is the amount of amount of information that 
need to be exchanged between tasks. In hard physical 
systems ai,j is determined by physical adjacency, material, 
energy and information transfer between components of the 
system. 
 
Coupling can be linear or non-linear (or complex 
according to Perrow). A linear coupling stays consistent 
with time or with change in the value of systems parameters 
or other couplings, so ai,j does not change its value, or even 
matrix A preserves its form for the entire operation of the 
system. This is however not the case for almost any system. 
Consider a vehicle for example. The coupling between 
engine and transmission is an increasing and nonlinear 
function of both velocity and acceleration of the vehicle. 
For example if an error occurs in engine causing some large 
vibrations, this is not likely to propagate to transmission 
system and cannot cause damage to the gear box when the 
gear is idle. However, when the car is moving the vibration 
propagates to the transmission through the gear box. The 
severity of this transmission, or coupling, varies for 
different speeds, road conditions, and accelerations.  
 
Assume that for a system the coupling matrix is 
always constant. A failure or error fi can occur in a 
component or element or procedure  i at any time during the 
operation. We can think of  fi a the percentage of error in 
the output or percentage of  lost functionality in i. Then 
given the coupling matrix A (that is a positive matrix) the 
error or fault or failure can propagate to other components, 
elements and procedures, like j and cause a functionality 
loss or error fj = fi× ai,j . If we stack up all the initial partial 
component failures in a failure vector F0 of size n×1 then 
we have: 
F1 = A×F0  
     
(1) 
 
where F1 is the failure status at a moment or an instance 
after the first error(s) occurred. If the errors go undetected 
then the failures keep on propagating until instance t when a 
component or procedure has totally failed:  
 
Ft = A × Ft-1 = At × F0  (2) 
 
We refer to t as time to failure. By a singular value 
decomposition of A we have: 
 
A = U1 Σ V1  (3) 
 
Where U1 and V1 are unitary matrices and Σ is a 
diagonal matrix with singular value of A on its diagonal. 
Then since V, U and Σ are square matrices we have: 
 
At = Ut Σt Vt  (4) 
 
And substituting back in (2): 
 
Ft = Ut Vt (Σt F0)  (5) 
 
Since Ft has a maximum of value of 1 (or 100% 
failure) it is not too difficult to see that Σ and t have an 
inverse relationship, which is essentially common sense. 
This means that a larger Σ leads to smaller t. Larger Σ 
means more overall coupling or complexity that leads to 
faster error growth due to propagation (see Figure 1). 
Reference [2] reported on simulations of these 
relationships. Note that the error propagation is still 
dependent on the occurrence of the initial error F0 and also 
the location of this initial failure in the failure vector (which 
corresponds to the identity of element of the system with an 
error). If the initial vector location corresponds to the 
largest singular value of A then the error propagates fastest 
possible. This represents a worst-case scenario and because 
of this the largest singular value of A is the complexity of 
the system. If the complexity is very high chances are that 
the error will propagate so fast that intervention becomes 
impossible, and a collapse is likely. Note that this is just the 
case of linear failure propagation through time. 
  
For a nonlinear system the coupling matrix changes 
over time and so does the complexity of the system. This 
means that for nonlinear systems the time to failure varies 
with state of the system operation. In summary the risk of 
tiny errors with small probabilities in complex systems is 
not negligible. The obvious reason for this is that fast 
propagation reduces the fault detectability, and increases 
the chances of a surprise failure. Fault detectability 
decreases with structural complexity. For highly complex 
systems surprise failure is highly possible. 
 
 
Figure 1. Time to failure versus complexity on a log log 
basis have an almost linear relationship.  
 
B. Complexity Escalation 
 
The central question is how might coupling 
inadvertently be made closer in an already complex system? 
Do classic risk mitigation schemes transform our systems 
towards less or more complexity over time?  
 
Figure 2 shows that any attempt towards risk 
management potentially increases the structural complexity 
and coupling that in turn creates more sensitivity to 
uncertainty and susceptibility to uncertainties and risks that 
the system was robust to beforehand.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Coupling-uncertainty spiral or complexity 
escalation.  
 
 
One way for this increased potential for risk might be 
by increasing the number of elements in the rule set of 
subordinate systems. This concept will be proposed in this 
paper to lend a real-life case where coupling was increased. 
Such an example could be a task executed by the 
subordinate system that initially appears relatively simple, 
like welding pipe, and moves the task to the regime of a 
complicated or complex task that is no longer executed well 
enough for the SOSE function. 
 
III. AN EXAMPLE: REPAIR OF SHIPS  
How would complexity and uncertainty be increased 
by a rulemaking process? We will examine an example of 
an industrial process that would appear to be limited to a 
specific component of the systems comprising the SOS, but 
has SOS implications. We will examine the system 
response to a problem in the pipe welding area in a large 
industrial organization that is responsible for maintenance 
of ships. This industrial organization is one component in a 
much larger system of systems where its role is to repair 
and modify large pieces of equipment used by other 
organizations in harsh environments. This industrial 
organization has codified many of its processes ranging 
from the industrial shop operations to engineering and 
information technology. It has developed a robust quality 
assurance capability and its leaders espouse the belief in 
continuous process improvement. Because the large pieces 
of equipment are used in harsh environments, the industrial 
organization subscribes to structured standards designed to 
ensure the repaired equipment is fit for purpose and will 
operate in the complete range of harsh environments for 
specific periods of time. 
 
One process used extensively by the industrial 
organization is welding. A variety of different metals are 
permanently fastened together using various welding 
processes. Welding often occurs inside the large pieces of 
equipment which must be protected to prevent damage to 
other components. Further, the weldments frequently form 
part of the structure required for successful operations in 
the aforementioned harsh environments. 
 
While most welds are accomplished flawlessly, there 
are occasional faulty welds, usually detected by a range of 
measures spanning visual inspection, nondestructive 
testing, or records review of the completed work as 
documented in the weld record card. Occasionally, the 
welder will recognize a flaw and self – identify the 
problem. 
 
The industrial organization has a process to categorize 
flaws, determine the immediate corrective action and 
determine if the flaw is in error that requires initiating a 
formal problem resolution process. For this example, the 
flaw is postulated to have been identified, classified by the 
organization, it is determined that it bears further action 
immediately. 
 
The industrial organization has a workgroup that 
assesses each flaw that merits higher analysis and action. 
Their first assessment is to classify the flaw as to the 
presence of human error. That human error could be 
welding proficiency, error in the technical document 
prepared by a technician for the welder, issuance of 
improper weld wire not detected by the welder or his 
supervisor, or any number of other failures humans can 
make. The flaw may have also been introduced by a 
mechanism other than human error. 
 
In this case, we postulate that the workgroup has 
assessed that this flaw is at least partially due to human 
error and designates a requirement for further corrective 
action. The further corrective action will be a formal 
critique which will include all of the workers involved, the 
immediate supervision, representatives from engineering 
and the project management team. At the critique, the flaw 
and its possible causes are reviewed, and potential actions 
to prevent recurrence are presented, discussed and selected 
actions to incorporate in one or more processes are decided 
upon. For this example, we will postulate that one or more 
additional process steps will be added to the welding 
process document. The engineering or shop management 
may elect that additional training be conducted for the 
specific welder or all welders and their supervisors before 
any further welding is performed. It is also possible that 
instead of immediate training, a decision may be made to 
include the new requirements in the periodic requalification 
training attended by all qualified or qualifying welders. 
 
The document used by the welder submitting the 
flawed work will be retrieved from the worksite and 
updated to the new requirements by engineering department 
personnel prior to work being allowed to resume. 
 
As part of the error elimination process, the 
engineering group may specify additional inspection 
requirements for this process. The inspections may be 
performed by the welder, the welder supervisor, or quality 
control inspectors. 
 
This is an ongoing process, with relatively frequent 
opportunities to enter the loop. The welding process is now 
more closely coupled than it was prior to flaw being 
detected and administratively being delivered to the error 
correction and remediation process. This process is depicted 
in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Internal system of response to flaws 
 
One might rightly ask: how does this process affect 
the system of systems? The answer lies in the relationship 
of the individual welding processes, and all the other 
industrial processes with the delivery date of the large piece 
of equipment back to its operational owner. Each addition 
to each industrial process has the opportunity to lengthen 
the critical path for the repair period. Thus, while on an 
individual basis, the revisions may seem trivial, 
cumulatively they can add up to lengthening the repair 
process, thus affecting the SOS.   
 
However, one additional method of imposing coupling 
has not yet been discussed. Returning to the organizational 
training, this industrial organization is only one of a number 
of similar organizations. A flaw of large magnitude and the 
corresponding actions assumed to permanently prevent the 
flaw from occurring again are transmitted to the system’s 
other organizations for incorporation in their welding (or 
any other industrial processes). Thus the larger system is 
also now more closely coupled, as all the other industrial 
organizations replicate the process of error detection, 
response, and development of corrective actions along with 
instantiation of permanent measures to prevent recurrence. 
Thus all the industrial organizations are contributing to 
increasing coupling, both internally and exporting it across 
their system boundaries industrial organizations. 
 
And before we move on, one last method of imposing 
coupling should be discussed. This industrial organization 
is part of a larger system that incorporates regulators, both 
internal and external. The internal regulators observe 
problems both inside the industrial organizations that they 
oversee and other organizations outside their purview. 
Occasionally, the internal regulators are stirred to take 
action by either the severity of a particular flaw, or a pattern 
indicating some larger action is required. In a similar 
fashion, external regulators, usually governmental, may 
impose some rulemaking across the whole industry or 
selected sectors/businesses. Functionally, these two sources 
are essentially injecting coupling into the industrial 
organization’s system which will eventually be translated to 
late return of the large equipment to their owners. A 
depiction of the interaction of internal and external 
regulators is show in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction of Internal and External regulators in 
coupling 
 
Another question remains to be discussed. The process 
of remediating flaws was designed with preventing flaws 
from reoccurring, why is it now perceived to be a problem 
itself? One would expect the total number of flaws to be 
reduced over time, with less rework, and improved schedule 
and cost performance. The answer to this question is that 
while the probability of anything going wrong is decreased 
by the risk mitigation measures, the possibility of a negative 
event is increased by tighter coupling of SOS processes. 
However, this doesn’t mean that something will necessarily 
go wrong. Thus while possibility of the error is collectively 
increased its necessity is not. This means that other 
potential errors (probably unforeseen to this point) have the 
possibility or opportunity to propagate through this tighter 
coupling. Thus although one source of uncertainty or error 
is reduced (that of welding) the system is now collectively 
more fragile. Since this notion is not attended to at the SOS 
governance level (which means that the possibility of 
collective error is deemed to reduce) any upcoming error 
will be a surprise, simply because such incident has been 
assigned a low possibility, and even a lower necessity. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have begun to explore potential for 
modeling the effect of tightening coupling with the purpose 
of being able to detect the boundary between effective 
operation of the SOS and what we have called collapse, 
where the collapse is instigated by lower level components 
of the SOS, potentially invisible to the higher level until it 
is too late. Currently, most discussions in this arena are 
driven by after the fact, backward looking hindsight. Few 
tools exist to assist the SOS operators in predicting the 
impending collapse. Thus, the authors believe that 
developing models that give such insights would be 
valuable. 
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